Abstract. MULTI2 is the block cipher used in the ISDB standard for scrambling digital multimedia content. MULTI2 is used in Japan to secure multimedia broadcasting, including recent applications like HDTV and mobile TV. It is the only cipher specified in the 2007 Japanese ARIB standard for conditional access systems. This paper presents a theoretical break of MULTI2 (not relevant in practice), with shortcut key recovery attacks for any number of rounds. We also describe equivalent keys and linear attacks on reduced versions with up 20 rounds (out of 32), improving on the previous 12-round attack by Matsui and Yamagishi. Practical attacks are presented on up to 16 rounds.
digital-TV, and several other countries are progressively switching to ISDB (Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Philippines and Venezuela). But for the moment only Japan uses the conditional access features of ISDB, thus MULTI2 is only used in Japan.
MULTI2 has a Feistel structure and encrypts 64-bit blocks using a 256-bit "system key" and a 64-bit "data key". The ISO register recommends at least 32 rounds. A previous work by Matsui and Yamagishi [11] reports attacks on a reduced version of MULTI2 with 12 rounds. Another work by Aoki and Kurokawa [1] reports an analysis of the round mappings of MULTI2, with results independently rediscovered in the present work.
Contribution. This paper presents new cryptanalytic results on MULTI2, including the description of large sets of equivalent keys, a guess-and-determine attack for any number of rounds, a linear attack on 20 rounds, and a relatedkey slide attack (see Table 1 for complexities). Despite no practical threat to conditional access systems, our results raise concerns on the intrinsic security of MULTI2. related-key slide key-recovery ⋆: time complexity is # of parity computations instead of # of encryptions.
Description of MULTI2
MULTI2 (Multi-Media Encryption Algorithm 2) is a Feistel block cipher that operates on 64-bit blocks, parametrized by a 64-bit data key and a 256-bit system key. Encryption depends only on a 256-bit key derived from the data and system keys. This encryption key is divided into eight subkeys. MULTI2 uses four keydependent round functions π 1 , π 2 , π 3 , and π 4 , repeated in this order. The ISO register entry recommends at least 32 rounds, which is the number of rounds used in the ISDB standard. We denote MULTI2's keys as follows, parsing them into 32-bit words (see Fig. 1 ):
is the 64-bit data key
is the 256-bit encryption key MULTI2 uses no S-boxes, but only a combination of XOR (⊕), modulo 2 32 addition (+) and subtraction (−), left rotation (≪) and logical OR (∨). Below we denote L (resp. R) the left (resp. right) half of the encrypted data, and k i a 32-bit encryption subkey:
• π 1 is the identity mapping:
It is the only surjective and key independent round transformation.
• π 2 maps 64 bits to 32 bits, and returns
where 
32 − 1 and the same holds if k i is fixed and 0 ≤ R ≤ 2 32 − 1.
• π 3 maps 96 bits to 32 bits, and returns
• π 4 maps 64 bits to 32 bits, and returns
From the definition of 3, it follows that π 4 (R, An additional property is the fact that these π j functions do not commute, that is, π i • π j = π j • π i , for i = j, where • is functional composition. Thus, the π j mapping cannot be purposefully clustered or permuted in the cipher framework to ease cryptanalysis. Encryption. Given subkeys k 1 , . . . , k 8 and a plaintext (L 0 , R 0 ), MULTI2 computes the first eight rounds as follows (see Fig. 1 ):
This sequence is repeated (with suitably incremented subscripts) until the desired number of rounds r, and the ciphertext (L r , R r ) is returned. The subkeys
Key Schedule. The key schedule of MULTI2 "encrypts" a data key (d 1 , d 2 ) (as plaintext) through nine rounds, using the system key s 1 , . . . , s 8 . The round subkeys k 1 , . . . , k 8 are extracted as follows (see Fig. 1 ):
MULTI2 in ISDB. In ISDB, MULTI2 is mainly used via the B-CAS card [6] for copy control to ensure that only valid subscribers are using the service. MULTI2 encrypts transport stream packets in CBC or OFB mode. The same system key is used for all conditional-access applications, and another system key is used for other applications (DTV, satellite, etc.). The 64-bit data key is refreshed every second, sent by the broadcaster and encrypted with another block cipher. Therefore only the data key is really secret, since the system key can be obtained from the receivers. Details can be found in the ARIB B25 standard [2] .
Equivalent Keys
The key schedule of MULTI2 maps a (256 + 64)-bit data-and-system key to a 256-bit encryption key (see Fig. 1 ). This means 64 bits of redundancy (leading to 2 64 collisions). Further, the 256-bit encryption key k = (k 1 , . . . , k 8 ) has entropy at most 192 bits, because the key schedule sets k 4 = k 3 ⊕ k 2 and k 8 = k 7 ⊕ k 6 . Hence, the knowledge of two subkeys in (k 2 , k 3 , k 4 ) is sufficient to compute the third. The key schedule thus induces a loss of at least 128 bits of entropy, from the 320-bit (s, d) key. Therefore, the average size of equivalence key classes is 2 128 . Large sets of colliding pairs (s, d) can be found as follows: given (s, d), one just has to find s
Each of these conditions are independent. The result is a (series of) equivalent keys (s ′ , d) that lead to the same encryption key as the pair (s, d).
However, there exist no equivalent keys with the same system key and distinct data keys. This is because the key schedule uses the data key as plaintext, hence the encryption key is trivially invertible (see Fig. 1 ).
Note that [8] suggests to use MULTI2 as building block for constructing hash functions. If the construction is not carefully chosen, however, equivalent keys in MULTI2 could lead to simple collisions. For example, in Davies-Meyer mode the compression function would return E m (h) ⊕ h, with h a chaining value and m a message block; since equivalent keys are easy to find, it is easy as well to find two (or more) distinct message block that produce the same encryption key, and thus that give multicollisions.
Guess-and-Determine Attack
We describe a known-plaintext attack that recovers the 256-bit encryption key in about 2
185.4 r-round encryptions. The attack works for any number r of rounds, and uses only three known plaintexts/ciphertext pairs.
We recall the loss of key entropy due to redundancy in the key schedule of MULTI2 described in Sect. 3.
One recovers k 1 , . . . , k 8 using a guess-and-determine strategy, exploiting the non-surjectivity of the round functions π 2 and π 4 (see key schedule in Fig. 1 
A guess of k 1 , . . . , k 8 is verified using three known-plaintext/ciphertext pairs (each pair gives a 64-bit condition). The total cost is about 2 185.4 r-round encryptions and 2 31 32-bit words of memory. Note that the non-surjectivity of π 3 (k 5 , s 6 , s 7 ) cannot be exploited here, because the range depends on the system subkeys, which are unknown.
Once the encryption key k is found, one can recover all equivalent 256-bit system keys s and 64-bit data keys d as follows: starting from the end of the key schedule ( Fig. 1) 
Linear Attacks
The non-surjectivity of the round functions π 2 , π 3 , π 4 motivates the study of linear relations [10] for particular bitmasks. Usually, one looks for nonzero input and output bitmasks for individual cipher components, with high bias. But for MULTI2, we look for linear relations of the form 0 πi → Γ , 2 ≤ i ≤ 4, Γ = 0. Because of 4-round repetition of π i mappings in MULTI2, and to optimize the search, we looked only for iterative linear relations that cover all four consecutive π i round mappings. In Fig. 2(a) , only π 2 and π 4 are active, that is, effectively participate in the linear relation (linear trails are depicted by thick lines). In Fig. 2(b) , π 2 and π 3 are active, but for π 3 the linear approximation has the form Γ π3 → Γ , where Γ = 0. Alternative iterative linear relations are depicted in Fig. 3 . In Fig. 3(a) , there is one instance of π 2 and π 4 , and two instances of π 3 active along the linear relation. Fig. 3(b) is just Fig. 3 We consider each round function as operating over 32-bit data (for a fixed, unknown key). Instead of deriving the bias for a given output bitmask, we have searched for promising bitmasks (with high bias), by exhaustive search over the inputs for each round function. From the linear relations listed above, the one in Fig. 2(a) is the most promising, since it involves only two active round functions for every four rounds: π 2 and π 4 . This is an indication that the left half of the MULTI2 encryption/decryption framework is weaker than the right half.
Our search (over random keys) started with masks of low Hamming weight. The use of rotation suggests that masks with short repeating patterns tend to show higher biases, which our experiments confirmed: the 32-bit mask Γ = AAAAAAAA x presented the highest bias: 2 −1 for π 2 , and 2 −6.7 for π 4 ( Fig. 2(a) ). The overall bias is p ′ = 2 −6.7 , using the piling-up lemma [10] . This bitmask was independently discovered by Aoki and Kurokawa in [1] .
Comparatively, for Fig. 2(b) , the best mask we have found is Γ = 88888888 x , with bias 2 −1 for π 2 , and 2 −8.6 for π 3 . The overall bias for four rounds is 2 −8.6 . Using Fig. 2(a) , one can distinguish 4-round MULTI2 from a random permutation using 8 × (p ′ ) −2 = 2 16.4 known plaintexts (KP), for a high success rate attack; the memory complexity is negligible and the attack effort is essentially 2
16.4 parity computations. For eight rounds, the attack complexity is
27.8 KP and equivalent parity computations; for twelve rounds, the data complexity becomes 8
For further rounds, more plaintexts than the codebook are required.
For key-recovery attacks on twenty rounds, we use the 12-round linear relation described in the previous paragraph. Notice that across 20-round MULTI2, the same sequence of four subkeys, k 1 , . . . , k 4 repeats at the first and at the last four rounds. Thus, we place the 12-round relation in the middle of 20-round MULTI2 and guess consecutively k 1 , k 2 (cost 2 32 for each of them), then k 3 (cost 2 30.7 ), and finally k 4 (free 
Related-Key Slide Attack
We present key-recovery known-plaintext related-key slide attacks [3] [4] [5] . These attacks exploit the partial similarity of 4-round sequences, and works for any version of MULTI2 whose number of rounds is a multiple of eight. Let Given an unknown key pair (s, d), we consider a related-key pair (s 
A slid pair gives P ′ = F 1···4 (P ), which implies We cannot filter the wrong slid pairs, so we try all possible 2 64 pairs (P i , P j ). But each potential slid pairs provides 128-bit condition, because both the plaintext and ciphertext pairs are keyed by the same unknown subkeys. Thus, we can filter the wrong subkeys at once.
To recover k 1 , . . . , k 4 we use the potential slid pair (P ′ j , P i ). Guess k 1 (2 32 choices). Then, guess k 2 (2 32 choices), and find the k 3 that yields the (known) output of π 3 . Deduce k 4 , as k 2 ⊕ k 3 and finally, test whether the current choice of k 1 , . . . , k 4 is consistent with the second potential slid pair (C ′ j , C i ). Finding k 3 from k 2 , the input of π 3 , and its output one has to solve an equation of the form (x ≪ 16) ⊕ (x ∨ L) = b, then an equation (t ≪ 1) − t = x, where x and t are the unknowns. The first can be solved bit per bit, by iteratively storing the solutions for each pair (x i , x i+16 ). There are 16 such pairs, and for each pair there are at most two solutions. Hence in the worst case there will be 2 16 solutions. The effort up to this point is roughly 2 32+32 = 2 64 π 2 and π 3 -computations.
In total, up to this point, there are 2 32+32+16 = 2 80 possible values for (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 ) . The value of k 4 = k 2 ⊕k 3 can be further checked using the (P i , P ′ j ) pair. Let P i = (P L , P R ) and P 
Conclusions
We showed that the 320-bit key of MULTI2 can be recovered in about 2 185 trials instead of 2 320 ideally, for any number of rounds, and using only three plaintext/ciphertext pairs. This weakness is due to the loss of entropy induced by the key schedule and the non-surjective round functions. We also described a linear (key-recovery) attack on up to 20 rounds, and a related-key slide attack in 2 128 /r r-round computations for any number r of rounds that is a multiple of eight (thus including the recommended 32 rounds).
Although our results do not represent any practical threat when the 32-round recommendation is followed, they show that the security of MULTI2 is not as high as expected, and raise concerns on its long-term reliability. A practical break of MULTI2 would have dramatic consequences: millions of receivers would have to be replaced, a new technology and new standards would have to be designed and implemented.
Finally, note that the Common Scrambling Algorithm (CSA), used in Europe through the digital-TV standard DVB 4 also underwent some (non-practical) attacks [15, 17] . For comparison, the American standard ATSC uses Triple-DES in CBC mode 5 .
